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Abstract. Judgment aggregation is a formal theory reasoning about
how a group of agents can aggregate individual judgments on connected
propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions. Three
procedures for successfully aggregating judgments sets are: premise-based
procedure, conclusion-based procedure and distance-based merging. The
conclusion-based procedure has been little investigated because it pro-
vides a way to aggregate the conclusions, but not the premises, thus it
outputs an incomplete judgment set. The goal of this paper is to present
a conclusion-based procedure outputting complete judgment sets.
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation [9, 10, 12] studies the aggregation of individual judgments
of small groups such as expert panels, legal courts, boards and councils. We talk
about judgment aggregation whenever a group of individuals needs to make a
collective decision on a finite set of issues, and these propositions are logically
connected. The propositions are of two kinds: premises and a conclusion. The
first serve as supporting reasons to derive a certain judgment on the conclusion.
If, for example [1], your department has to hire a new lecturer and the decision
rule is such that a candidate X will be hired only if the candidate is good at
teaching and good at research, we will say that “hiring X” is the conclusion
while “good at teaching” and “good at research” are the premises.
How shall we derive a group decision given the individuals’ opinions on
premises and conclusion? It is assumed that each individual expresses yes/no
opinions on the propositions while respecting the logical relations. If we now
define the group opinion as the majority view on the issues, it turns out that the
collectivity may have to endorse an inconsistent position. This means that your
department may have to face a situation in which a majority does not deem X a
good candidate. However, it will not be possible to provide reasons for this as a
majority of people agrees that X is actually good at teaching and (another) ma-
jority deems X to be good at research. An example of such situation is presented
in Table 1.
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a = X is good at teaching b = X is good at research x = hire X
prof. A yes no no
prof. B yes yes yes
prof. C no yes no
Majority yes yes no
Table 1. Hiring committee example. The candidate X is hired if and only if X is good
at teaching and X is good at research.
The problem is avoided if we decide to let the majority vote on the premises to
dictate the final decision on the hiring process, or if the agents express their judg-
ments only on the conclusion. Unlike the aggregation procedure on the premises
[14, 5], the aggregation on the conclusion has not been throughly investigated.
We claim that in many decision problems the conclusion is more relevant
than the reasons for it. When deciding which candidate to hire in your depart-
ment, you may be more concerned of which new colleague you will have in your
department than of the reasons for choosing her. Considering only the individual
judgments on the conclusions has also the advantage that it is a strategy-proof
procedure.The same does not hold when you aggregate on the premises.
The problem this paper addresses is how a group can make decisions on the
conclusion while providing reasons in support of the collective conclusion. Our
procedure prioritizes the individual judgments on the conclusion and outputs
sets of premises that support the collective decision.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present the problem
of judgment aggregation. Section 3 is devoted to our formal framework, and
in Section 4 we prove some results about our procedure. Section 5 relates our
approach with existing work and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and
outlines directions for future work.
2 Judgment aggregation
In judgment aggregation agents are required to express judgments (in the form
of yes/no or, equivalently, 1/0) over premises and conclusion. As in [20], to
represent the distinction between premise and conclusion in our language, we
distinguish between premise variables a, b, c, p, q . . ., and conclusion variable x.
In the hiring example, “X is good at teaching” is premise a, and “X is good
at research” is premise b. The decision rule can be formally expressed by the
rule (a∧ b)↔ x, where x is the conclusion about hiring X. Each member of the
department expresses her judgment on the propositions a, b and x such that the
rule (a ∧ b)↔ x is satisfied.
Suppose the three professors in the department make their judgments ac-
cording to Table 1. Each member expresses a consistent opinion, i.e. she says
yes to x if and only if she says yes to both a and b. However, propositionwise
majority voting (consisting in the separate aggregation of the votes for each
proposition a, b and x via majority rule) results in a majority for a and b and
yet a majority for ¬x. This is an inconsistent collective result, in the sense that
{a, b,¬x, (a ∧ b)↔ x} is inconsistent in propositional logic. The paradox lies in
the fact that majority voting can lead a group of rational agents to endorse an
irrational collective judgment. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to
such problems as the doctrinal paradox (or discursive dilemma).
The relevance of such aggregation problems applies to all situations in which
individual binary evaluations need to be combined into a group decision. Fur-
thermore, the problem of aggregating individual judgments is not restricted to
majority voting, but it applies to all aggregation procedures satisfying some
seemingly desirable conditions. For an overview, the reader is referred to [13].
Two ways to avoid the inconsistency are the premise-based procedure (PBP)
and the conclusion-based procedure (CBP) [17, 3]. According to the PBP, each
agent votes on each premise. The conclusion is then inferred from the rule (a ∧
b) ↔ x and from the judgment of the majority of the group on a and b. If
the professors of the example followed the premise-based procedure, the lecturer
would be hired.
Because in PBP the collective judgment on the conclusion is derived from
the individual judgments on the premises, it can happen that PBP violates a
unanimous vote on the conclusion. In [16] Nehring presents a variation on the
discursive dilemma, which he calls the Paretian dilemma. In his example, a
three-judges court has
to decide whether a defendant has to pay damages to the plaintiff. Legal
doctrine requires that damages are due if and only if the following three
premises are established: 1) the defendant had a duty to take care, 2)
the defendant behaved negligently, 3) his negligence caused damage to
the plaintiff. ([16], p.1)
Suppose that the judges vote as in Table 2.
Agenda a b c x = (a ∧ b ∧ c)
Judge A 1 1 0 0
Judge B 0 1 1 0
Judge C 1 0 1 0
Majority 1 1 1 0
Table 2. Paretian dilemma. Premises: a = duty, b = negligence., c = causation. Con-
clusion: x = (a ∧ b ∧ c) = damages.
The Paretian dilemma is disturbing because, if the judges would follow PBP,
they would condemn the defendant to pay damages contradicting the unanimous
belief of the court that the defendant is not liable.
A CBP would not lead to such a unanimity violation. According to CBP, the
judges decide privately on a and b and only express their opinions on x publicly.
The judgement of the group is then inferred from applying the majority rule to
the agents’ judgments on x. The defendant will be declared liable if and only
if a majority of the judges actually believes that she is liable. In the example,
contrary to PBP, the application of CBP would free the defendant. However, no
reasons for the court decision could be supplied.
Unlike PBP [14, 5], CBP did not receive much attention in the literature. Here
we aim at filling this gap. We propose a procedure that attempts to overcome
the major limit of CBP, that is the lack of reasons supporting the decision.
3 Framework
In this section we introduce our formal framework to represent judgment aggre-
gation problems. A set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} makes judgments on logically
interconnected propositions. The set P of atomic propositions is defined as the
union of two disjoint sets: Pp containing variables a, b, c, . . . , p, q for the premises,
and Pc being a singleton {x}, where x is the variable for the conclusion. We as-
sume that the conclusion is an atomic formula. L is a language built from P,
including complex formulas as ¬a, (a ∧ b), (a ∨ b), (p→ q), (a↔ p).
The set of issues on which the judgments have to be made is called agenda
and is denoted by Φ ⊆ L. The agenda is assumed to be finite and closed under
negation: if a ∈ Φ, then ¬a ∈ Φ.1 Each double negated proposition ¬¬a is
identified with its corresponding non negated proposition a. We split the agenda
in two parts: one containing the premises (Φp), and one containing the conclusion
(Φc). We exclude agenda items such as a→ x, i.e. formulas containing premises
and conclusion. Our procedure consists of two different aggregations: one on the
individual judgments on Φp and one on the individual judgments on Φc.
A subset J ⊆ Φ is the collective judgment set and contains the set of propo-
sitions believed by the group. Similarly, we define individual i’s judgment set
Ji ⊆ Φ. A collective judgment set is consistent if it is a consistent set in L, and
is complete if, for any a ∈ L, a ∈ J or ¬a ∈ J (consistent and complete indi-
vidual judgment sets are defined in the same way). We only consider consistent
complete judgment sets.
A decision rule R is a formula of L that represents the logical connections
between premises and conclusion. More precisely, R has the form Ψ ↔ x, where
Ψ ∈ L/{x}. The decision rule is not an item of the agenda. This means that
the group members do not vote on R, but each individual is required to give
judgments that satisfy the given rule.
Like the agenda, each judgment set is split in two disjoint subsets: Ji,p and
Ji,c. The first is the individual i’s judgment set on the premises, and Ji,c is the
individual i’s judgment set on the conclusion. The collective judgment sets on
premises and conclusion will be denoted respectively by Jp and Jc.
We say that a premise a (resp. a conclusion x) is unanimously supported if
a ∈ Ji,p for all Ji,p ⊆ Φ (resp. x ∈ Ji,c for all Ji,c ⊆ Φ).
A profile J is an n-tuple (J1, J2, . . . , Jn) of agents’ judgment sets. An aggre-
gation rule F assigns a set of collective judgment sets J to each profile J . For
1 To increase readability, in the tables we list only the positive issues, and assume
that, for any issue in the agenda, an individual deems that issue to be true if and
only if she deems its negation to be false.
our procedure we need to define two aggregation rules: one for the aggregation
of the individual premises and one for the conclusion. To relate the two aggre-
gation rules, we have a set of integrity constraints IC. IC indicates the set of
admissible interpretations, i.e. the admissible collective judgment sets. Also, to
allow for situations in which the aggregated judgment set is not unique, i.e. there
are ties, we aggregate the profiles into sets of aggregated judgment sets.
A premise profile Jp is an n-tuple (J1,p, J2,p, . . . , Jn,p) of agents’ judgment
sets on premises. A premise aggregation rule FIC assigns a set of collective judg-
ment sets Jp to each premise profile (J1,p, J2,p, . . . , Jn,p) and set of integrity
constraints IC. Conclusion profiles (J1,c, J2,c, . . . , Jn,c) and conclusion aggrega-
tion rules Fc are defined similarly.
3.1 Complete conclusion-based procedure
Each individual provides, simultaneously, the set of premises and conclusion
that she believes. Our two-step procedure first performs a standard CBP, i.e.
it aggregates the individual judgments on the conclusion by majority rule. This
means that x (resp. ¬x) is the collective conclusion iff there are at least bn2 c+ 1
agents voting for x (resp. ¬x). The second step consists in determining the set
of reasons which support the collective conclusion. This is done by applying a
distance-based merging operator to Ji,p.
Distance minimization merging procedures have been already applied to judg-
ment aggregation problems [18]. In this section we briefly present a majority
merging operator with integrity constraints following [8, 7]. Unlike in [8, 7], when
the merging operator outputs ties, we take the disjunction of the formulas which
completely characterize the tied alternatives.
An interpretation is a function v : P → {0, 1} and it is represented as the list
of the binary evaluations. For example, given three propositional variables a, b
and c, the vector (0,1,0) stands for the interpretation in which a and c are false
and b is true. LetW = {0, 1}P be the set of all interpretations. An interpretation
is a model of a propositional formula if and only if it makes the formula true in
the usual truth functional way.
Let us suppose that Φp = {a,¬a, b,¬b, c,¬c}, and that agent 1 believes that
a,¬b and ¬c, i.e. J1,p = {a,¬b,¬c}. We represent J1,p as a 0-1 vector of length
equal to the number of propositions in J1,p, i.e. (1, 0, 0). Suppose also that R =
((a ∨ b) ∧ c)↔ x and that, unlike agent 1, the majority of the individuals voted
in favor of x. Hence, the first step of our procedure sets v(x) = 1. We now want
to define an aggregation on Ji,p such that the collective judgment set on the
premises is one of the models of ((a ∨ b) ∧ c) ↔ x where v(x) = 1. This means
that Jp must be one of the following interpretations: (1,1,1), (0,1,1), (1,0,1). The
set of premises supporting the collective conclusion will constrain the aggregation
procedure on Ji,p.
Given a premise profile Jp and IC, FIC(Jp) denotes a set of collective judg-
ment sets on the premises resulting from the IC merging on Jp. The idea of a
distance minimization merging operator is that FIC(Jp) will select those inter-
pretations in IC, which are at minimal distance from Jp. A distance d(ω, Jp)
between an interpretation ω and the premise profile Jp induces a total pre-order
(≤) on the interpretations.
In order to obtain the total pre-order on the interpretations, we first need
to determine a pseudo-distance between each admissible interpretation and each
Ji,p. Then, we need to aggregate all these values in order to obtain a pseudo-
distance value between an interpretation and Jp. Let us see this in detail (we
follow [8, 7]).
A pseudo-distance between interpretations is a function d : W ×W → R+
such that for all ω, ω′ ∈ W: d(ω, ω′) = d(ω′, ω) and d(ω, ω′) = 0 iff ω = ω′.
A pseudo-distance between an interpretation ω and Jp is defined with the help
of an aggregation functionD: Rn+ → R+ asDd(ω, Jp)=D (d(ω, J1,p), . . . , d(ω, Jn,p))
[7]. Any such aggregation function induces a total pre-order 6Jp on the set W
with respect to the pseudo-distances to a given Jp. Thus, an IC majority merg-
ing operator for a profile Jp can be defined as ∆IC(Jp) = min([IC],6Jp), i.e.,
the set of all models of IC (denoted by [IC]) with minimal pseudo-distance Dd
to Jp. The minimal pseudo-distance identifies the final collective outcome on
the premises, i.e. the set of premises that support the conclusion voted by the
majority of the agents and with the minimal distance among all possible models
satisfying IC.
A majority merging operator, often mentioned in the literature, is the oper-
ator ∆d,ΣIC defined as follows:
1. d is the Hamming distance — the number of propositional letters on which
two interpretations differ, i.e., d(ω, ω′) = |{pi ∈ P|ω(pi) 6= ω′(pi)}| and
2. Dd(ω, Jp) =
∑
id(ω, Ji,p) is the sum of componentwise distances d defined
before.
For example, the Hamming distance between ω = (1, 0, 0) and ω′ = (0, 1, 0) is
d(ω, ω′) = 2. In the following we use the Hamming distance because it is a well
known and intuitive distance. But the Hamming distance is only one among
many possible distance functions that we may use.
The premise aggregation rule FIC outputs the disjunction of formulas which
completely characterize the sets of judgments selected by ∆d,ΣIC as the reasons in
support of the conclusion voted by the majority of the agents. Given a premise




The constraint IC is defined as IC = R ∧ xˆ, where xˆ is the conclusion chosen
by the majority.
The best way to illustrate our procedure is with an example.
Example 1. Consider a collegium medicum that wishes to eliminate the possi-
bility of a patient suffering from condition X before administering a treatment.
We take v(x) = 0 if the patient is free of X. The doctors consider the three
relevant alternative medical conditions a, b and c the patient may suffer from.
The patient is free of X if medical conditions a, b and c are present (v(a) = 1,
v(b) = 1 and v(c) = 1), if all three medical conditions are absent (v(a) = 0,
v(b) = 0 and v(c) = 0) or if the last condition is present while the previous two
are absent (v(a) = 0, v(b) = 0 and v(c) = 1). In all other cases the patient is
likely to suffer from X. Table 3 gives the truth table of R.
a 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
c 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
x 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Table 3. The truth table of R for the doctor example.
Three equally qualified members of the collegium medicum give their opinions
shown in Table 4. As Table 4 shows, the group is facing a dilemma. The majority
of the conclusions from the doctors opinions indicates that the patient does
not suffer from X though the majority on the premises supports the opposite
conclusion.
Our procedure (see Table 5) selects the reasons that are most compatible
with the doctors’ different opinions, i.e. the judgment set (1,1,1).
Agenda a b c x
Dr. A 1 1 1 0
Dr. B 0 0 0 0
Dr. C 1 1 0 1
Majority 1 1 0 0
Table 4. The dilemma faced by the
doctors.
J1,p J2,p J3,p Σi d(ω, Ji,p)
(1,1,1) 0 3 1 4
(0,0,0) 3 0 2 5
(0,0,1) 2 1 3 6
Table 5. Selection of the premise set from
the doctors opinions under the constraint
v(x) = 0.
By applying the same procedure, the premises selected for the discursive
dilemma in Table 2 with v(x) = 0 would be (0, 1) ∨ (1, 0), representing a tie
between X is good at teaching but bad at research and X is good at research
but bad at teaching.
Example 1 illustrates that, when aggregating the premises, we do not only
take into account the judgment sets of the agents that support the aggregated
conclusion, but also the judgment sets of agents that do not support the conclu-
sion. Consider for example the selection of premises with v(x) = 1 in Table 4.
We take also the judgment set of Dr. C into account, although she voted for
v(x) = 1.
The justification for taking all individual judgments on the premises into
account is two-folded. On the one hand, from the perspective of probability
theory, if all judgments are independent, then more judgment sets mean a higher
chance to get a better judgment. On the other hand, from the perspective of
democracy, involving agents whose conclusion is not supported will give broader
basis for the decision. However, we do not exclude the possibility that there
are situations in which only the individuals’ judgments that actually supported
the aggregated conclusion should be taken into account when determining the
reasons for that conclusion.
4 Results
We now show some properties which hold for the premise aggregation rule FIC
we had defined in the previous section. We start by noticing that, in the case
of the aggregation of binary evaluations, there is an obvious correspondence
between proposition-wise majority voting and distance minimization. This has
been already observed in several contexts (see, e.g., [2]), and can be generalized
to the following folk theorem.
Proposition 1. Let J = (J1, . . . , Jn) be a profile over the agenda Φ. Let Jmaj ⊂
Φ be a complete and consistent set. Let it hold that for every premise a ∈ Jmaj,
a ∈ Ji,p for at least bn2 c+1 premise sets in the profile Jp. Also, for the conclusion
x ∈ Jmaj, let it holds that x ∈ Ji,c for at least bn2 c + 1 conclusion sets in the
profile Jc. The sum of Hamming distances from Jmaj to the judgment sets in J
is minimal.
This means that, in the absence of a Paretian dilemma (i.e. when Jmaj
satisfies the decision rule R), proposition-wise majority voting, distance-based
merging and our procedure coincide.
4.1 Unanimity preservation
One of the desirable properties for a judgment aggregation procedure is the
heeding of unanimity. If all the agents unanimously support an agenda item, then
it is natural to expect the unanimously supported item will be adopted as the
collective judgment. However, PBP does not necessarily preserve unanimity on
the conclusion (as it was the case with the Paretian dilemma shown in Table 2).
PBP aggregates each premise independently from the other premises, but
the aggregation on the conclusion depends on the collective judgments on the
premises. Therefore the unanimity on the premises will be preserved, but the
unanimity on the conclusion may be violated.
When aggregating according to the CBP, unanimity on the conclusion will
always be maintained, but unanimity on the premises may be violated. However,
our procedure offers the option to preserve unanimity on the premises as well,
by constraining the models which do not support unanimity.
We begin by giving a formal definition on when a premise aggregation rule
FIC preserves unanimity. Whether or not the unanimity on the premises is pre-
served by our FIC depends on the rule R as well as the agenda Φ. We show two
decision rules for which the unanimity is preserved and then we use an example
to show that in the case of an arbitrary rule and agenda, the unanimity of the
premises is not guaranteed.
Definition 1. Let Jp = (J1,p, . . . , Jn,p) be a premise profile on the agenda Φ
and p a premise from the agenda. A premise aggregation rule FIC preserves
unanimity on the premises if and only if the following holds:
If p ∈ Ji,p for all i = {1, . . . , n} then p ∈ FIC(Jp).
Note that, since FIC can select more than one premise judgment set, p needs
to be in all of them for unanimity to be preserved.
The following theorem indicates two decision rules R, and an agenda, in the
presence of which unanimity is preserved on the premises by FIC .
Theorem 1. Let Φ be an agenda in which all the elements are atoms or nega-
tions of atoms. Let R be a decision rule of the form (a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an) ↔ x or of
the form (a1 ∨ . . . ∨ an) ↔ x. {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ Φ are premises and x ⊆ Φ is a
conclusion. FIC preserves unanimity on the premises for any profile J over Φ
and R.
Due to strict page limit constraints the proofs are omitted2.
Given an arbitrary agenda, a decision rule R corresponding to that agenda
and an arbitrary profile J , the merging operator does not necessary preserve
unanimity. We show this through an example.
Consider the profile presented in Table 6. The rule R is such that the value
of x is 1 if and only if the evaluations of the premises are one of the sets in the
first column of Table 7. For all other evaluations of premises, x is 0.
Our procedure preserves the unanimity on the conclusion and selects v(x) = 1,
but gives an aggregation for the premises which violates the unanimity on
premise p13 (Table 7).
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12 p13 x
A 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
B 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
C 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Maj. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table 6. A case in which unanimity on premises will be violated by the complete CBP.
J1,p J2,p J3,p Σid()
(1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1) 0 8 8 16
(0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1) 8 0 8 16
(0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) 8 8 0 16
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) 5 5 5 15
Table 7. Selection of premises for the counterexample.
The preservation of unanimously held premises can be imposed by IC. This
is done by making IC = R∧ xˆ∧p∗, where p∗ is any unanimously voted premise.
Admissible outcomes for Jp then are those supporting the conclusion voted by
the majority and containing the premise(s) unanimously chosen.
2 The proofs are included in [19]
4.2 Manipulability
Another property which is of interest when dealing with aggregation procedures
is that of manipulability. A judgment aggregation procedure is called manipula-
ble if an agent, who would not obtain a desired outcome by submitting her sincere
premise set, can obtain a desired outcome by choosing to submit a set of premises
different than her honest premise set. Under the context of complete-conclusion
based procedures, we will distinguish between full and preferred manipulability.
Full manipulability means that we distinguish only whether the aggregated
premise set entirely corresponds to an agent’s judgments on premises or not. A
procedure is fully manipulable if an agent can obtain her complete honest premise
set as an output from the procedure by submitting another (insincere) premise
set that supports the same conclusion. Formally, let Jp = (J1,p, . . . , Ji,p . . . , Jn,p)
be a premise profile. Let FIC(Jp) = {J◦1,p, . . . , J◦m,p}, i.e. the merging operator
selects the premise sets J◦1,p, . . . , J
◦
m,p. Let Ji,p be the “honest” premise set of an
agent i.
Definition 2. Assume that a premise set J∗i,p 6= Ji,p exists, such that J∗i,p sup-
ports the same conclusion as the premise set Ji,p. The operator FIC is fully ma-
nipulable if Ji,p ∈ FIC(J1,p, . . . , J∗i,p . . . , Jn,p) but Ji,p 6∈ FIC(J1,p, . . . , Ji,p, . . . ,
Jn,p).
Theorem 2. FIC is not fully manipulable.
Let us now assume that an agent has a premise p which she holds most im-
portant (has a strong preference on the evaluation of this premise). We say that
a procedure is preferred manipulable if an agent can ensure that the preferred
projection w(p) is included in the output by submitting another premise set that
supports the same conclusion. Since we do not represent the preferred premise
explicitly in our framework, any premise can be the preferred one, and preferred
manipulability therefore means that the agent is able to change her premise set
in a way such that one premise which is not a member of the aggregated set
becomes member of it.
Definition 3. Assume that a premise set J∗i,p 6= Ji,p exists, such that J∗i,p sup-
ports the same conclusion as the premise set Ji,p and premise ppref is in both
of the premise sets. The operator FIC is preferred manipulable if ppref is in at
least one premise set J◦j,p ∈ FIC(J1,p, . . . , J∗i,p, . . . , Jn,p), but ¬ppref is in all of
the premise sets selected by FIC(J1,p, . . . , Ji,p, . . . , Jn,p).
Theorem 3. FIC is preferred manipulable.
Full manipulability is a relatively weak condition, in the sense that it is
fairly easy to satisfy. This notion of preferred manipulability seems to conflict
with the intuition of the distance measure used to aggregate the premises, which
does take such distinctions into account. However, preferred manipulability is a
very strong condition, since it means in practice that an agent should not be
able to improve any premise (since this premise may happen to be the preferred
one). Other notions of manipulability could be studied, such as the improvement
of a preferred premise by changing the judgment on this premise only.
5 Related work
One of the noted shortcomings of the CBP is that it is susceptible to path-
dependence [15]. Path-dependent decisions are decisions whose outcome depends
on the order in which propositions are considered. For any proposition, the col-
lective judgment on it is decided by majority rule (or by any other suitable ag-
gregation rule) unless this conflicts with the collective judgments of previously
aggregated propositions. In the latter case, the collective value of that proposi-
tion is deduced by logical implication from the previously aggregated proposi-
tions. List [11] provided necessary and sufficient conditions for path-dependence.
Furthermore, in [4] it has been shown that the absence of path-dependence is
equivalent to strategy-proofness.
Here we propose a complete CBP without assuming any order over the
premises. We aimed at a procedure that treats all premises in an even-handed
way. The absence of full manipulability is coherent with the results of [4].
Non-manipulability is one of the advantages of CBP over PBP. The question
of manipulability under operators used for merging of propositions has been
treated extensively in [6]. There, Everaere et al. explore a broad spectrum of
manipulability for various merging operators over complete and incomplete sets
of beliefs. Our work uses results from [6] on complete sets of beliefs under model-
based merging operators that use the sum of the distances between belief bases.
6 Conclusions and future work
The complete CBP we present keeps the desirable properties of non-manipulability
and it can be modified to preserve unanimity on the premises. What can be
considered a shortcoming of the procedure is that it may select more than one
premise judgment set to support the collective conclusion. Such “ties” in the out-
put from aggregation are known to be resolved with an additional approval vote
[2] or by random selection. A random selection is not a desirable tie-breaking so-
lution in cases when the decisions on premises can influence some future decision
making process. The approval voting requires more information to be injected
in the framework and opens the questions of what incentives an agent may have
to prefer one premise judgment set over another.
In future work we plan to investigate the relevance that current group deci-
sions can have on future decisions. This “evolutionary” impact over the decision
making process has been an important issue in the work that gave rise to the
interest in judgment aggregation [9, 10], but it has fallen out of scope in the more
formal study of judgment aggregation.
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